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The Lakes of Europe 
I. Introduction 
Usually, Europe is defined and designed along the geography it constitutes 
and the history it accrued. The political organization of Europe is related to 
both of it and at the same time not free of contradictions with regard to any 
reasonable meaning of a “European identity“. There are more institutions 
than one, given the existence of the European Union, the Council of 
Europe, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and - last 
but not least - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which institutional-
izes the United States of America as a European power. Europe is grap-
pling with its borders towards the East and the South East. Can Russia be-
long to the core institutions of Europe? Is Turkey a European country? In 
any case, the discussion is following the primacy of territorial thinking. 
Europe, that is Europe’s territory and the ambition to link it both with 
Europe’s past and the future Europe hopes for. 
But Europe, that is also Europe’s lakes, the seas and waters which are an 
integral nevertheless peripheral part of Europe’s shape. The Mediterranean 
and the Black Seas, even the Caspian and certainly the Baltic and the North 
Sea do impact on Europe’s self-perception and are related to many of the 
challenges ahead of Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
They are no less important than the Atlantic Ocean has unquestionably 
been for the shaping and the destiny of Europe in the course of the last five 
hundred years, culminating in the important role the north American de-
mocracies have played for Europe during the twentieth century.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Intuitively, contemporary Europeans tend to perceive the waters which sur-
round and enclose European territories as borders, as limits and dividing 
lines. The opposite coast lines constitute “the other“, far away and often 
strange lands. At least they are likely to divide and to constitute black - and 
wet - holes without meaning and reason. This, however, may very well 
change in the course of the next years. A Europe which is defining its iden-
tity and is shaping its political organizations can no longer overlook the 
fact that its surrounding waters are an integral part of the shaping and mak-
ing of the “new Europe“. The lakes of Europe are part of Europe since they 
constitute bridges rather than barriers. For better or worse, the opposite 
coast lines are part and parcel of Europe’s future. This seems to be evident 
in the case of the Atlantic Ocean although transatlantic relations are going 
through a period of deep redefinition since the binding glue of the common 
enmities of the Cold War is no more. The Baltic Sea is rediscovering that it 
is the magnetic force which brings its adjacent nations closer together than 
ever before since centuries. The Black Sea has only begun to discover the 
meaning and potential of the very same fact. The North Sea is still defining 
the global view of countries such as Iceland and Norway, while the Caspian 
Sea is being reinvented as a function of its sea-bed and the surrounding oil 
and gas fields. 
II.  Mediterranean: Between cradle of civilizations and 
bridge for new partnership 
A unique case is - and has ever been - the Mediterranean. For almost three 
thousand years, the world’s largest inland sea has been a theatre of world 
history. The coasts of this arm of the Atlantic Ocean, to which it is con-
nected by the Straits of Gibraltar, divided naturally by the Italian peninsula 
and Sicily into a Western and an Eastern half, have been the stage for ex-
ceptional cultural and political developments. Naturally linked to the Black 
Sea by the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus, and since 
the nineteenth century by the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean 
islands have harbored sailors from all directions for thousands of years and 
its surrounding cities have always looked towards the water as much as to-
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wards any of their hinterland. The Mediterranean has been a school for 
sailors and cartographs, a battlefield for adventurers and conquerors, a 
market place and both the anchor and the promoter of religious creeds and 
missionary activities, peaceful and violent alike.  
The term “Mare mediterraneum“ reflects the claim of late Roman rule over 
all its shores and insinuates the character of a geographically defined com-
munity of values and habits. The discovery of the Atlantic African coasts 
and the New World across the unknown Ocean was the beginning of a re-
definition of the Mediterranean. It was no longer the unchallengeable cen-
ter of gravity of the entire earth. At the same time, it opened the eyes for 
new links with other parts of the globe. More than ever before, the Crimean 
War (1853-1856) linked the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, thus open-
ing the Mediterranean towards the enormous land masses of Asia. The 
opening of the Suez Canal (1869) produced an outlet towards the Indian 
Ocean and reinvigorated the trading potential of the Mediterranean which it 
had lost since the discovery of the New World in the Americas. The Medi-
terranean has a size of 2,5 million square kilometers, the maximum length 
is about 2.300 miles between Gibraltar and the Syrian coast, the maximum 
width about 1000 miles between Libya and the Adriatic coasts of Slovenia 
and Italy; its deepest point is 5.267 meter. Millions of tourists are flooding 
its beaches every year and if it would only be for this reason: among Euro-
peans from Malta to Hammerfest, today it seems agreed upon that the 
Mediterranean is theirs. 
This claim can however no longer be sustained. In 1950, two thirds of the 
population of the Mediterranean lived on its northern shores. In 2000, the 
opposite had become true. The European Union has defined the Mediterra-
nean as the common market of around 800 million people who are living 
around its basin. This has been the starting point for the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership arrangement which begun in 1995 with a sum-
mit meeting in Barcelona, where the “Barcelona Declaration“ has been 
promulgated by all (then) 15 EU member states, 11 countries of the South-
ern rim of the Mediterranean and the Palestinian Autonomy Authority. 
Libya, the former pariah, has reluctantly begun to join the Euro-
Mediterranean process since then, although it is still grappling with the fact 
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that at the beginning it was not welcomed as a terrorist state while now the 
EU is courting Libya, which is vacillating between its European interests 
and its African mission. Nevertheless, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
thus accommodates the EU and all governments of the Southern rim of the 
Mediterranean. This does, however, not imply yet that all are following a 
common perception and vision of the Mediterranean.
1 Although the idea to 
form a common free trade zone by the year 2010 has found support of all 
partners of the Barcelona process, it remains questionable whether this 
alone can already substantiate the modernized version of a joint “mare nos-
trum“, a lake of all the people surrounding it.  
The third question is one of balanced interests. What does Europe really 
want: Free trade or democracy? Cooperation or containment? Dialogue or a 
monopoly of norms? Who can speak for the Southern partners? Elites of 
authoritarian regimes or civil societies? Politics or business? Pluralistic cul-
tures or religious leaders? And what is the broader purpose of Mediterra-
nean Dialogue: another means to jointly fight terrorism or a cover for 
building fences between the two shores in the light of terrorism spreading 
from certain Islamic circles? 
There are manifold reasons for this skepticism. The first one is geographi-
cal in nature. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue – or in short hand the 
“Barcelona Process“ - includes all EU member countries, but only the di-
rect coastal countries of the Southern rim, thus leaving open whether such a 
composition is not by the very nature of its design Euro-centric while ne-
glecting to link it with the strategic peripheries of the southern side of the 
Mediterranean, the Arab peninsula, Iraq and Iran, but also Mauritania and 
Western Sahara. The term “Euro-Mediterranean” seems inconsistent. It 
should rather be a “Mediterranean partnership” with links to the peripheral 
neighbors in the “Greater Mediterranean Area”. The second question is of a 
political nature. Does the “Barcelona Declaration“ of 1995, the Magna  
 
1 See  Stephen C. Calleya, Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Medi-
terranean, ZEI Discussion Paper C75/2000 (Bonn: Center for European Integration 
Studies) 
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Charta of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, truly reflect the combined in-
terests, perceptions and potentials of all partners or is it more of a superfi-
cial declaratory character, neither binding nor free from contradictions, 
which are inherent in the complexity of the very region? Does it take into 
consideration all the different needs and approaches of all the partners or 
does it push for economic integration – a European interest -, while ne-
glecting the social concerns of the Southern Mediterranean partners – who 
have a point by stressing that the economic reforms which they are obliged 
to implement might cause too much social hardship and thus endanger the 
political stability Europe is so much looking forward to maintain? 
Finally - or firstly - there is the historical argument whether there has ever 
been a common Mediterranean “feeling“, how it was made possible and 
why did former efforts to maintain it fail? Anybody only superficially pe-
rusing historical maps of the Mediterranean can discover the shifting nature 
of its centers of gravity, its uniting forces and dividing lines, and - most 
importantly - the changing determinants which constituted the Mediterra-
nean as a single, rather united region. A former French Foreign Minister, 
Couve de Murville, was blatant: in the 1960s he stated “La Mediterrannée, 
ça n’existe pas“ -The Mediterranean does not exist. 
Did it ever exist? Greek and Phoenician colonization spread the model of 
trading cities around the Mediterranean. The expeditions of Ionians even 
reached the shores of the Black Sea (Pontos Euxeinos) and the Phonicians 
looked around the Straits of Gibraltar (Tingis, Lixos, Gades).The Greek 
Wars against the Persians helped to define European identity against “the 
other“, the barbarians, without incorporating the whole Mediterranean into 
the purview of this perception. Hellenism, Romanisation, and the begin-
nings of Christianity refer to the dominant role of the Eastern Mediterra-
nean and its hinterland, while the rise of the Roman Empire was colliding 
with the ambitions of Carthage in the Western Mediterranean, escalating in 
two Punian Wars which finally destroyed Carthage. 
The world of the Roman Empire during the peak of its power saw the 
Mediterranean united - and its peripheries spreading beyond Gallia (today’s 
France) into regions which nowadays form part of the European Union or 
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aspire to join it - the British Isles (Britannia Inferior, Caledonia), the Alps 
(Raetia, Noricum), Western Germany (Germania Superior), Hungary (Pan-
nonia), Western Romania (Dacia Superior) and Bulgaria (Moesia and 
Thracia). The economy of the Roman Empire linked its European parts 
with the Southern shores of the Mediterranean which contributed grain, 
wood, figs, oil, glas, purple and fish to its resources. Christianity started to 
get rooted all across the Mediterranean. Even the split between East and 
West Rome in the late fourth century could not fundamentally undermine 
the integrity of the Mediterranean, indicating however that the “mare inter-
num“ as it was labeled at the time split into two different halves although 
both were still breathing Christian spirit and Roman ambition; Libya was, 
by the way, cut into two, Tripolitania belonging to the West Roman Empire 
and Libya Superior to the East Roman Empire. 
The end of the Western Roman Empire saw a temporary revitalization of 
the Mediterranean idea under the Byzantine Empire which was spreading 
under Justinianus all the way to Numidia (today’s Tunisia and Algeria) and 
Malaga (Southern Spain) with an outlet in Septum (in today’s Morocco). It 
was the Arab migration and the spread of Islam during the seventh century 
which put an end to the all too romantic idea of the unity of the Mediterra-
nean. The southern rim became Muslim, Arabs conquered Andalusia and 
even stood in Poitiers, not all too far away from Paris. The unity of the 
Mediterranean was lost in religious division and strife, escalating during 
the Crusades (11
th -13
th century), which had a lasting impact on the sensi-
bilities and perceptions on both sides until this day. The fall of Byzantium 
in 1453 and the rise of the Ottoman Empire until it reached its biggest size 
in the 17
th century was seen in Christian Europe as the ultimate threat to its 
very existence. It left a mark on Christian-Muslim relations until today. 
Most dramatically, this has been demonstrated during the Yugoslavian 
Wars of Succession in the 1990s. 
The Ottoman Empire and the vassals it collected along the southern rim of 
the Mediterranean never generated the same homogeneity of rule over the 
Mediterranean as it has been the case during the heydays of the Roman 
Empire. In spite of the comprehensive spread of Islam to the westernmost 
regions of the Mediterranean - and deep into sub-Saharan Africa - religious 
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and political unity did never fully overlap in the world of Islam, and 
Europe was able to put an end to Ottoman expansion in Vienna in the 18
th 
century. Given the important role of Turks in the Ottoman Empire and the 
fact that both the Balkan part and the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire 
were located on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, from this time 
onward there was no doubt any more about differences between the West-
ern and the Eastern part of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean idea be-
came a myth or went into oblivion.  
The Europe of the Vienna congress, colonialism and two world wars, the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of new nation states on both sides 
of the Mediterranean, finally the development of the European Union - 
with a parallel development of Communist states in South Eastern Europe - 
and the various efforts to create Arab unity in the light of the presence of 
the Jewish state of Israel - none of these structures or processes was able to 
reinvent the Mediterranean as a unity. Today the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership is lacking participation of the South Eastern European littoral coun-
tries of the Eastern Mediterranean. A Mediterranean idea, if there was ever 
one, never coincided with comprehensive political concepts and structures. 
In the light of such cyclical experiences and constant patterns of diversity, 
it remains indeed doubtful whether the idea of a common market and a free 
trade zone can reignite the myth of a Mediterranean spirit in the 21
st cen-
tury. Life, after all, is more than a market, more than goods and services, 
investments and trading rules. Has there ever been a truly Mediterranean 
idea based on partnership between the different peoples, religions and tradi-
tions on both sides, in all directions of the Mediterranean? Travel books 
account for it in the name of tourism and education which remains however 
a pleasure predominantly confined to the Northern inhabitants of the Medi-
terranean. The magisterial study of French historian Fernand Braudel “La 
Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II“ (1949) 
is a masterpiece indeed, never copied for any other period in time, but even 
in all its substance and distinguished differentiation it focuses somewhat on 
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the Mediterranean through European eyes.
2 Braudel is not to blame for this, 
since anybody, no matter how cosmopolitan, remains somewhat myopic if 
it comes to the analysis of one’s own neighbors, let alone adversaries. 
In this light, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched in Barcelona in 
1995 is certainly an ambitious idea. It has basically been driven by the in-
terests of the European Union and can be seen as continuous with European 
Mediterranean policy since the creation of the European Economic Com-
munity in 1957. The first phase, lasting from 1957 until 1972, was based on 
bilateral trade agreements with partial association elements or preferred 
trade products. The second phase, from 1972 until 1990, was defined by the 
political and geopolitical parameters of the Mediterranean. The Middle 
East conflict challenged the EEC to develop a stronger political posture in 
the region while the Euro-Arab Dialogue was an offspring of the overall 
North-South policy of the time. It was the end of the Cold War which al-
lowed the European Union to reassess its policies vis-à-vis the Mediterra-
nean. This led to the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the 
promulgation of the Barcelona Declaration.
3  
Analogue to the approach of the “Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe”, the Barcelona Declaration identified three fields of co-
operation among the Mediterranean partners: Political stability and secu-
rity, economic cooperation, and cooperation in cultural, humanitarian and 
social matters. The process which begun in Barcelona was intended to give 
a new dimension to the Mediterranean future, “based on comprehensive co-
operation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links 
forged by neighborhood and history“
4 The political declaration was fol-
lowed by a substantial working programme which the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners promised to implement in the years to come. 
 
2  Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Phil-
ippe II, 2 Volumes, Paris: Armand Colin 1949 
3 See  Carlo Masala, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte - Struktur - 
Prozeß, ZEI Discussion Paper C 68/2000 (Bonn: Center for European Integration 
Studies) 
4 The European Commission (Ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Barcelona 
Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27./28.11.1995, at: http: 
europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/bd.htm. 
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Certain positive effects of the Barcelona process cannot be denied. Con-
tinuous diplomatic, political and economic dialogues have been estab-
lished. New fields of cooperation have been discovered in social and cul-
tural matters. Nevertheless, skepticism has been voiced whether the multi-
lateral and trans-regional approach of the Barcelona process can truly serve 
its purpose. In the light of the many historically rooted diversities in the 
region - with various Eastern and Western sub-regions - it seems appropri-
ate to reconsider sub-regional orientations to make the whole set of ideas 
defined in the Barcelona Declaration work. Given that the ongoing Middle 
East conflict permanently impacts on the Barcelona vision and tends to 
hold hostage other aspects of the Mediterranean cooperation scheme, “a 
special and enhanced framework of partnership with the Maghreb“ has 
been suggested, to name but one specific initiative.
5 The EU has begun to 
recognize the potential of such a Western Mediterranean core by opening 
up the Barcelona process to Mauritania, the westernmost country with a 
strong Arab influence. 
Mediterranean policies remain somewhat obliged to try to square the circle. 
This is due to two contradictory and mutually reinforcing facts: On the one 
hand, for geostrategic and geoeconomic reasons the Mediterranean is a 
unity. As a strategic zone in the back of the Atlantic and in the weak South 
of Europe, the Mediterranean has to be stable in order to serve the interests 
both of the United States and the European Union. As a geoeconomic en-
tity, the Mediterranean as one comprehensive market is of interest both for 
trade and investment purposes as much as its relevance as a source of en-
ergy resources and other goods of interests remains confined to the specific 
local sources; not all Mediterranean countries contribute the same resources 
or offer the same market potential. 
Politically, the Mediterranean is as diverse as it is culturally pluralistic. A 
monolithic equation “democracies in the North, authoritarian regimes in the 
South“ is too simplistic, while the dividing line between Islam and Christi-
anity is much too complex to be that of a simple North-South-issue: 
 
5  Roberto Aliboni, New Directions in European-North African Relations, in: The 
Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4/Spring 2001, p. 63 
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Around 18 million citizens in the European Union are Muslim and origi-
nate from the Southern rim, Turkey including, while there are Christian 
communities all over the Southern rim, in the Levante in particular, and 
Jews outside of Israel in the Muslim world, particularly in Turkey and Mo-
rocco. This cultural and ethnic diversity rather supports the idea of a com-
prehensive Mediterranean policy, while at the same time the complexity of 
this diversity makes it extremely difficult to consistently be implemented. 
From a European point of view, the most important problem is not one of 
squaring the circle in terms of bringing multilevel policy approaches into a 
more or less consistent line. Europe’s experiences with the “three basket 
approach“ of the “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” has 
demonstrated the ability of the West to play with various balls while con-
tinuously pursuing the same policy goals. The problem is not one of in-
struments but one of strategy. The European Union has never clearly made 
up its mind what the Barcelona Process truly stands for. Different actors 
have different thoughts and the dividing lines are not necessarily based on 
geographic proximity or national interests. 
For some, a Mediterranean policy serves to ensure Europe’s security on its 
Southern flank. With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean South - 
along with the crisis bow stretching from Turkey across Iraq and Iran into 
Central Asia, - has been identified as the next security challenge to Europe. 
Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration, un-
cooperative regimes, radical political Islam and historical neuroses might 
form the potential of new and lasting threats to Europe and its desire for 
peace, stability and prosperity. Is Hannibal truly “ante portas“?
6 
Others define the Mediterranean as a developmental problem. Both legal 
and clandestine migration are certainly a consequence of social and eco- 
 
6 See  Andreas Jacobs/Carlo Masala, Hannibal ante portas? Analysen zur Sicherheit 
an der Südflanke Europas, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000; see also Roberto Ali-
boni/Abdel Monem Said Aly/Alvaro de  Vasconcelos, Joint Report on the Eu-
roMesSCO Working Group on Political and Security Cooperation, (Lisbon) 1997 
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nomic problems in the Southern Mediterranean, a shortage of employment 
and limited perspectives for an improved standard of living. The underde-
veloped infrastructure in the Southern Mediterranean countries impedes 
speedy regional development. Environmental disasters could effect the 
northern Mediterranean countries as much as they do impose their dirty 
consequences on Europe’s poor southern neighbors. Obstacles to integrate 
them into the world economy as competitive partners - only oil rich coun-
tries such as Algeria or Libya can offer enough of the desired resources in 
order to build up a bargaining power - and a limited participation in the 
fruits of “globalization“ (i.e. in access to information technologies) define 
some of the hindrances to the region’s booming and as such becoming 
more attractive for European investment and trade. But can a development 
oriented relationship between the EU and the set of Southern Mediterra-
nean countries ever be more than an asymmetric dependency rather than a 
symmetric partnership?
7 
Again others see the Mediterranean as the ancient cradle of civilizations 
and a modern test case for a humanitarian dialogue among cultures. From 
the point of view of theology and religious sciences, literature and history, 
as many points of contact and cooperation can be identified as there are dif-
ferences and opposing, even adversary aspects of Euro-Arab or Christian-
Islamic relations. Is the Mediterranean not determined to serve its role as 
promoter of cooperation and tolerance among the religions of the book - 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam - and the cultures and civilizations which 
developed on both sides of its shores ?
8 On this account there is an enor-
mous, yet untapped potential for cooperation in a spirit of fair partnership. 
In the past, European humanities including Christianity, Latin and Greek 
 
7 See  Jürgen Wiemann, Die Mittelmeerpolitik, in: Franz Nuscheler/Otto 
Schmuck(Ed.), Die Süd-Politik der EG. Europas entwicklungspolitische Verant-
wortung in der veränderten Weltordnung, Bonn: Europa Union 1992; Felix Maier 
(Ed.), Managing asymmetric interdependencies within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, ZEI Discussion Paper C 101/2002 (Bonn: Center for European Integra-
tion Studies) 
8 See  Carlo Masala(Ed.), Der Mittelmeerraum - Brücke oder Grenze?, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2002 (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung/Center 
for European Integration Studies, Vol. 48) 
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classics were clearly separated from Oriental Studies, including Arab, Ot-
toman (Turkish) and Persian classics. It would indeed be a fascinating en-
deavor to combine both approaches and to transform them into the joint 
parameters of “Mediterranean Humanities”. Jordan’s Prince El Hassan bin 
Talal, President of the Club of Rome, was the first personality of public 
standing to suggest such a plan
9 
Finally the geostrategists, which are looking at the Mediterranean with a 
bird eyes view, having in mind the geopolitical shifts which started to un-
fold since the end of the Cold War. In the light of necessary energy sup-
plies to the Western world - which might well be advised to be diversified 
between Persian Gulf resources and new potentials in the Caspian Sea re-
gion - stability and cooperative patterns of behavior are the most important 
element required from the Mediterranean. Such a view, rather more devel-
oped in the US than in the EU, although effecting the future of the EU as 
much as that of the US, sees the Mediterranean as a zone of intensive stra-
tegic concern and interest to the West.
10 There is always a short-cut from 
the overall geopolitical perception to a specific view on the role of the 
Middle East conflict on the Mediterranean partnership. 
The related problems are evident. The South Mediterranean countries want 
to see a higher political profile of the EU in the Middle East peace process, 
Israel is rather interested in the economic potential of Europe and scared 
that Europe could politically become too lenient to the Arab arguments, the 
US is inclined to think along similar lines while not leaving out any possi-
bility of good economic relations with Arab countries, Libya included, 
aside, while the EU tries to be fair and objective in its political assessment, 
low-profiled in its political posture and not always realizing that by doing 
 
9 Private  correspondence  with the author, July 21, 2001 
10 See  F. Stephen Larrabee/Carla Thorson, Mediterranean Security: New Issues and 
Challenges, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1996; F.Stephen Larrabee/Jerrold 
Green/Ian O.Lesser/Michele Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Is-
sues and Dilemmas, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1997; Annette Jünemann, 
Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen und 
Zielkonflikte, in: Wulfdieter Zippel (Ed.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 1999, pp. 29 ff. 
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so, it does not necessarily serve its economic ambitions in the region while 
restraining its political posture unnecessarily. 
The European Union is inclined to start its Middle East strategy with an 
analysis of the need to organize soft security in this troubled region (confi-
dence building measures, economic and social cooperation etc.) which is 
neither wrong in itself nor unappreciated by all the actors involved. Such an 
approach does, however, not eliminate the fact that the top priority has to 
be the creation of a sustainable break-through in the field of hard security, 
including a solution to the most troublesome question of the future of 
Jerusalem, the most holy city for Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. The 
EU has accrued trust and confidence among all actors in the seemingly 
endless Middle East conflict. It has to capitalize on this by broadening its 
own commitment to peace and stability by looking beyond the huge agenda 
of soft-security. A lasting peace in the Middle East seems imaginable only 
if the EU would also participate in securing its elements. This must finally 
lead to EU participation in some sort of peace keeping operations in the 
Middle East. 
Depending on the point of departure, the road map of analysis and assess-
ment can be extremely different. The point of arrival certainly is. The 
European Union is therefore constantly challenged to maintain its multi-
level and highly diversified approach for the Euro-Mediterranean partner-
ship, while it can neither be sure of the consistency of interests of its 
Southern partners nor of the interests within the European Union. Not the 
least relevant of them is the question of the role of the United States in the 
Mediterranean. Strategic commonalties, such as those important for resolv-
ing problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting 
against terrorism, stable energy supplies and other natural resources, might 
clash with specific interests such as the European inclination towards an 
inclusive policy towards Libya, the balanced position of the European Un-
ion in the Middle East conflict and a differentiated approach to the role of 
Islam in politics and modern society. 
A comprehensive security partnership between the EU, its Mediterranean 
partners and the US is also dependent upon the resolution of contradictions 
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and shortcomings in the European approach to the region. No transregional 
approach can overcome the primordial importance of the Middle East con-
flict which is impacting on all dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership and holds it potentially hostage. No transregional approach should 
undermine or neglect the special role France is playing in the Western 
Mediterranean as a consequence of its long standing proximity to Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia. And no transregional approach can overlook conflicts 
of interests between the EU’s Mediterranean strategy and the ambition of 
integrating the Balkan region into the European structures . The latter has 
become a top priority of EU policy making since the end of the Kosovo 
War. Although South Eastern Europe does belong to the Mediterranean, the 
challenge of integrating the Balkans is more of an EU homework (“Euro-
peanizing the Balkan“) and thus until now not properly linked to an overall 
design for the Mediterranean. One could even argue that the EU has to 
“Europeanize Europe“ by transforming and integrating South Eastern 
Europe first before it can truly look out for a Mediterranean partnership. 
Conflicts of aims thus remain inevitable. In terms of political and material 
resources, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is definitely and re-
grettably limiting a more pro-active policy of the EU in the Maghreb re-
gion, which requires stabilization on all accounts.  
The effect of the financial support of the Middle East Peace process 
through the European Union remains dependent upon progress on the very 
issue of peace making which does - at least so far - not involve the Euro-
pean Union as a key player. Given that the United States is the only actor 
involved in the whole Mediterranean, any comprehensive partnership in the 
Mediterranean will have to be based on strategic consistency and comple-
mentarity in Euro-American approaches to the region. The US have be-
come and will remain a Mediterranean power. They will ever more remain 
present in the region at the beginning of the 21
st century since they pre-
sented themselves for the first time in 1804 by bombarding Libya (for the 
first time) in retaliation against attacks of Tripolitanian pirates. The Medi-
terranean, in turn, still is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean as the implications of 
the courageous explorations of the 15
th century have already indicated for 
the first time in modern history. 
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Europe’s perception of the Mediterranean and its activities in the Mediter-
ranean cannot be freed from these constant factors. The Euro-
Mediterranean partnership remains based on an integral, comprehensive 
approach which is intended to support peace, stability and prosperity as 
much as good governance, democracy and cultural dialogue. Such a com-
plex approach opens ways for compromises, ad-hoc package-deals, diversi-
fied policy instruments and a certain division of labor among the EU part-
ners under the broad umbrella of a comprehensive general plan. On the 
other hand, it is endangered to become hostage of blockade policies by one 
or the other partner of the process, who tries to pursue specific interests at 
the expense of the whole process. In the end, there will be no alternative to 
the Euro-Mediterranean equivalent of a “géometrie variable”: A rather di-
versified and differentiated policy for regions and issues, depending on 
variable interests, instruments and goals of the European Union and its 
southern partners. And surely this will be a policy which reckons with the 
American role and interest in the Mediterranean. How far such a complex 
and complicated strategy can be handled by the evolving Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the European Union is another question. It requires a 
strong hand and a clear, comprehensive vision, while allowing the highest 
necessary amount of diversity and adaptation to circumstances and devel-
opments without loosing sight of the overall idea of Mediterranean partner-
ship. In other words: So far, the European Union has not resolved the 
agenda of its relationship with the neighboring South, but has rather de-
fined a tall and ambitious frame for it. The academic reflection on the 
Mediterranean has all reason to echo this in the years ahead. This alone 
would be a useful and welcome contribution to the creation of a vital role 
for the Mediterranean Lake in the shaping of the new Europe. 
The success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership remains to be seen. But 
one consequence is already evident. The Mediterranean is no longer and 
solely a sea merely concerning the direct inhabitants of its shores. No mat-
ter how different the emotional and rational proximity of European Union 
citizens in Malaga or Tartu, Thessaloniki or Edinburgh might well be: Be-
longing to the very same European Union, they are irreversibly involved in 
the same policy approaches and will be living under the same consequences 
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of it. There is no longer such a thing as a particular Southern European in-
terest in the Mediterranean. The concrete effects of the Mediterranean will 
certainly continue to have a strong relevance for the citizens of Spain, Italy 
or Greece. But by the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, also 
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden have become Mediterranean countries. This 
is not free from inconsistencies and also therefore not always understood, 
let alone appreciated among all Southern Mediterranean partners. But it has 
become a fact they have to live with. A case in point are the implications of 
Malta’s accession to the European Union. They will have implications for 
the emigration regime of Malta, which will have to accept the acquis com-
munautaire of the “Schengen Accord”. Libya, for instance, can no longer 
maintain its special relationship and privileges with Malta; visas will be-
come inevitable for Libyans visiting Malta. This gives Malta a hard time to 
explain and Libya some confusion to understand since at the same time it 
receives signals from Brussels to gradually and substantially opening up to 
the EU. But so it is, underlining that the EU as a whole has embarked on 
the project of partnership in the Mediterranean. 
In that sense, the Mediterranean has developed into a European lake, no 
matter what the intensity of its presence and impact for all EU citizens - no 
matter what the agenda for dialogue and partnership among the northern 
and the southern rim countries - might be. But the Mediterranean is also 
part of the bigger Atlantic Ocean, its scope and strategic implication. In 
that sense, there can hardly be an autonomous “Mediterraneanism“ without 
recognizing the broader circumstances and dependencies which remain vi-
tal for the Mediterranean in the 21
st century. 
One of the broader dimensions clearly relates to Africa. This continent has 
clearly been neglected by Europe over the last decades – and mismanaged 
by many of its own regimes. New efforts to bring Africa back to the atten-
tion of Europe have to be organized around strategies of hopes. Libya, the 
most difficult of all partners in the Barcelona process, was clearly right by 
stating the need for a greater interest of Europe – and the whole world - in 
Africa. A substantial partnership between the European Union and the de-
veloping African Union, founded with strong Libyan encouragement in 
2001, is not an easy task. The Mediterranean partnership could certainly 
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play an instrumental role in such a noble effort. It would need to broaden 
the horizon of all partners of the Barcelona process beyond the very goals 
and instruments of the Mediterranean partnership as such. By looking be-
yond itself towards a new beginning with Africa, the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership could serve its true and timely historic purpose. This would not 
only qualify the Mediterranean partnership, but would rather put it into a 
perspective of a broader meaning. The Euro-Mediterranean process would 
not be left fertile and useless in such a context but could rather become a 
necessary but transient vehicle to serve more than itself. No matter how 
long such a development might take: A new beginning by a successful ad-
aptation and consistent development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
would truly position Europe as a world partner, which is looking beyond its 
geographic peripheries and the historical intricacies stemming from this 
into the sphere of global visions and responsibilities. In fact, it could one 
day be the ultimate justification of the Mediterranean partnership. 
III. Black Sea and Caspian Sea: Lakes at the South 
Eastern Periphery 
Europe’s neighborhoods to the East link the Mediterranean with the Black 
Sea and beyond the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea. The gap is big be-
tween those who perceive the Black Sea as a region of historical encounters 
of civilizations and thus as a field of culture and those who define the 
Black and Caspian Sea as elements of a strategic redefinition of geopoliti-
cal and geo-economic tendencies in the early 21
st century. Both dimensions 
- culture and geopolitics - are indeed defining the frame of Europe’s en-
counter with its neighborhoods east of the Mediterranean. It remains a chal-
lenge whether and how all possible dimensions of Europe’s Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea neighborhoods will be transformed into a viable and sustain-
able political concept and architecture.  
It has to recognize that the water of the lakes at the South Eastern fringes of 
Europe do not divide regions and people that share its shores without being 
truly linked to each other. It also has to take note of the traditional and con-
tinuous potential of conflicts and the diversity of interests and orientations 
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in one the of most fascinating regions of the world. The mountain range of 
the Caucasus is both linking and dividing the Black Sea region from the 
Caspian Sea. It remains to this day one of the most diverse and complicated 
regions at the borders of Europe. To constructively turn antagonisms into 
commonalties and divisions into bridges requires patience and far-sighted 
visions. 
The necessary long duration to properly “install“ the Black Sea and the 
Caspian Sea as “European lakes“ will have to begin with an overall new 
assessment and perception of the Black Sea. The first to have demonstrated 
the potential of cooperation and to project the will to bring the shores of 
this great lake together were the ancient Greeks. They started to settle parts 
of the fertile coast of this sea, whose dark-blue, almost black water stands 
in sharp and less inviting contrast to the light and charming blue of the 
Mediterranean. With the exception of the Gulf of Odessa and the Sea of 
Azov it is a huge oval basin, more than 2600 meters deep at its center. The 
ground of the Black Sea, whose salt density is less than the Mediterranean 
water, is covered by dark mud. After the Greeks had been lured into the 
Black Sea by the paths of its dolphins and their search for new trading 
posts, they called it “Pontus Euxeinos“. The lonians set up colonies like 
Odessos, Tyras, Theodosia, Tanais - at the northern edge of the Azov Sea - 
Diskurias, Trapezunt and Sinope, the Dorians established traces of their 
own in Mesembria, Kallatis and Herakleia. 
Alexander the Great, the subsequent Hellenic powers, the Roman Empire 
and its Byzantine heir with its client states began to cut the understanding 
of an integral Black Sea by focussing on its Southern shores. Trade and 
power as well as the spread of Christianity was concentrated on the South-
ern littoral of the Black Sea and stretched from there rather to the East than 
to the opposite side of the waters. Merchant activities of Venetians, Ge-
noese and traders from Pisa, who even tried to establish a settlement - Porto 
Pisano - in the Azov Sea, found their echo in the developments among 
Bulgars, Petschenegens, Cherkessians and Crimean Goths on the North 
side of the Black Sea. The Golden Hordes and others signed the guest book 
of the region. While the 13
th to 15
th centuries saw a fascinating encounter of 
civilizations in the area, a political or even cultural concept of Black Sea 
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unity was missing. The Genoese founded Eupatoria (Balaklava) and with 
their initiative Kaffa (Feodosyia) became a flourishing center for trade and 
commerce. The links of trade and commerce - also with Venice and Pisa - 
brought the most modern naval technology and banking practices from It-
aly into the region. But it was only with the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia 
that the Black Sea region was beginning to achieve cultural unity - in the 
name of Islam and following what had been started by Muslim Tartars on 
the northern shores of the Black Sea. 
The Islamic Ottoman Empire was also grabbing for the Northern shores of 
the Black Sea, where the semi-independent Crimean Khanate and inde-
pendent, unruly Cherkessians left their own mark in history. With the ap-
proaching Russian invaders, a new chapter began in the late 18
th century 
when Catharine the Great annexed the Crimean peninsula in 1783. Ottoman 
and Czarist Russian rivalry in the Black Sea during the 19
th century culmi-
nated in the Crimean War, which began in 1853. The United Kingdom, 
France and the Ottoman Empire formed a united front against Russia. Its 
Black Fleet ships were sunk in Sevastopol, and the European allies landed 
in the Crimea, finally conquering Sevastopol after a fierce siege. The Cri-
mean War ended on March 18, 1856 with the Treaty of Paris. Russia lost 
its right to a Black Sea fleet and was deprived of Southern Bessarabia, 
while Ottoman Turkey became a member of the European state system. 
Turkish and Soviet confrontation during the decades of the Cold War in the 
20
th century was in a way but a variation of a historic theme. A constant 
during the 19
th and 20
th century was the involvement of outside “super-
powers“ in the region, the British and French first, later followed by the 
Americans. 
With the end of the Cold War, a new chapter was opened in the understand-
ing and perception of the Black Sea. Driven by Turkey, a Black Sea Eco-
nomic Cooperation scheme became the new vision for the region. On June 
25, 1992, the heads of state or government of eleven states met in Istanbul 
to sign the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact. Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey 
and the Ukraine wanted to let the world know that the Greater Black Sea 
area with around 350 million people and vast natural resources such as gas, 
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oil, coal, wood and ore deposits would be a new center of gravity in the 
emerging new world order. In the years to follow, a substantial intergov-
ernmental structure was established, including a Permanent Secretariat in 
Istanbul, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki and a 
coordination center for the exchange of statistical data and economic in-
formation in Ankara. A Parliamentary Assembly was founded in 1993 and 
a Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force in 2001. Already in 1999, the 
United Nations had granted the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organi-
zation observer status in the United Nations where it is entitled to partici-
pate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly. 
The rediscovery of unifying factors was put into perspective by the prevail-
ing asymmetries with regard to potential and approaches, goals and speed 
of the acting countries. The unifying principles of this latest effort to har-
monize interests and perceptions around the Black Sea were evident: secu-
rity and prosperity. Less consensual was the degree of rule of law and de-
mocracy which is necessary to properly and fully establish and maintain a 
market economy. But also on other accounts, differences in the Black Sea 
region remained: the relations of the participating countries of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Organization with the EU, Europe and with the 
Near East remained diverse; so were the overlaps between geopolitical and 
regional interests and potentials of the actors around the Black Sea. 
The dominant role of Turkey in Black Sea Economic Cooperation has been 
the source of various controversial debates from the very beginning of its 
work. 
11 It is, however, true that the interests of Turkey in pushing Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation have been lauded by all other participant coun-
tries since its potential effects will certainly also be in their own interest. 
Critical observers seem to assume that the Black Sea Economic Coopera-
tion has, at least so far, fell short of hopes and expectations while the Or-
ganization itself is pointing to its potential and ever increasing visibility: 
-  after the Gulf, the second largest source of oil and natural gas; 
 
11  Even the Internet presentation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organiza-
tion is handled through the homepage of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
under: www.bsec.gov.tr 
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-  a foreign trade capacity of over 300 billion US Dollars annually; 
-  an abundant labor force as well as creative and well-trained human re-
sources; 
-  a broad manufacturing base although in need of modernization; 
-  a strategic location for maritime transport, ship-building and repairing. 
In other words: The Black Sea Region wants to be seen as the center of 
Eurasia with its enormous wealth of cultures and experiences and its unique 
geographic features which are naturally linked with the Caspian Sea on the 
one hand and the Mediterranean on the other. It wants to be more than just 
an infrastructural hub for commerce and trade in the field of natural energy 
resources, although this has been the almost single aspect which has been 
able to carry the regional agenda of the Black Sea Cooperation partners 
into an element of new global politics. Since this is inevitably linked with 
the potential and role of the Caspian Sea region, the two areas are easily 
connected by the strategists of geopolitics and geoeconomics as they de-
veloped since the end of the Cold War in 1990. 
Oil and gas have been the keywords for any consideration about the pros-
pects of the Caspian Sea region not to eternally remain at the peripheries of 
both Europe and Asia , but to be transformed into one of its centers of grav-
ity. Proven oil reserves estimates vary between 15 and 40 billion barrels, 
representing 1,5 to 4 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Estimates 
of proven gas reserves range from 6.7 to 9.2 trillion cubic meters, repre-
senting 6 to 7 per cent of the world gas reserves. Whatever the true figures 
of existing resources are: the Caspian Sea region is important for the diver-
sification of Western energy supply, notwithstanding the fact that its share 
might remain small compared with the 269 billion barrels of proven oil re-
serves already discovered in Saudi Arabia. The bulk of Caspian Sea region 
oil lies in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the bulk of gas in Turkmenistan, 
which has the fourth largest reserves in the world, with Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan having almost similar amounts. 
Much of what has been said and written about the Caspian Sea Region 
since the end of the Cold War had to do with hopes and speculations, with 
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a redefinition of the great geopolitical and geo-economic chessboard in the 
wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Zbigniew Brzezinski included 
the Caspian Sea region into “the global zone of percolating violence“
12, an 
analysis which has clearly achieved new resonance since the brutal terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Since the end of the 
Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea is landlocked between Azerbaijan, Iran, Ka-
zakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Russia and Azerbaijan, after all, are 
member states of the Council of Europe, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
join them as members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. To perceive the Caspian Sea as a “European lake“ has nevertheless 
neither become common knowledge nor did it find overall appreciation. As 
seen from Europe, the Caspian Sea remains “out there, even behind Tur-
key“.  
The race for energy resources in the region has nevertheless found interest 
in Europe, though less than it has in the United States. The study of possi-
ble pipeline projects and their geopolitical implications was a widely 
spread field of analysis during the 1990s. The range of objectives spread 
from “circumventing Russia“ to “diversifying dependency on the Gulf re-
gion“, from “empowering Turkey’s role in Europe“ to “rebuilding the an-
cient Silk Road to China“. In spite of the symbolic signing of the contracts 
to begin the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan-Pipeline in the presence of President Clin-
ton in 1999, more recent analyses focus increasingly on the prospects of 
reactivating routes running through Iran and on the activities of the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium which belongs to Russia, Kazakhstan, Oman and to 
various international oil companies. Its pipeline, beginning in the Tengiz 
Oil field in Kazakhstan and hitting the Black Sea at Noworossijsk, was able 
to fill the first oil tanker in August 2001. This route, which ultimately leads 
through the Bosporus Straits, has led to environmental concerns in densely 
populated Istanbul, although legal experts have reminded Turkey on the 
obligation under the Montreux Convention of 1936 to provide free shipping 
through the Bosporus. In any case, the potential of the Caspian Pipeline 
 
12  Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrate-
gic Imperatives, New York: Harper Collins 1997, p. 53 
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Consortium is the single biggest addition to the world oil market since the 
explorations of oil in Alaska and the North Sea began during the 1970s. 
The more relations between the US and Russia are improving, the more 
likely is a stronger focus on the Russian pipeline over rather costly projects 
through the Caucasus. Geopolitical considerations - particularly concerning 
the future role of Russia, of Turkey, of Iran and possibly even of China - 
are critically linked with US interests in the new geoeconomics of the Cas-
pian Sea region. Europe so far remains more of an observer than an active 
player in any of the strategically relevant fields. The scholarly discussion in 
Europe on the Caspian Sea region remains somewhat detached as if it were 
an area not so relevant to the future shape of Europe’s political and strate-
gic architecture.
13 Of the six violent conflicts which occurred in the former 
Soviet Union after its break-up, four occurred in the Caucasus (the others 
took place in Tajikistan and in Transdniestria): Given the ethnic tensions in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkazia, Chechnya and Dagestan, the European focus 
is understandably more on conflict resolution and on the role which the 
OSCE does and could play in future conflict prevention in the region of the 
Caspian Sea.
14 The big, overall geopolitical “Politics of Oil“ has not be-
come a priority of Europe’s approach to the region at its most south eastern 
periphery. 
This does not mean that the European Union would not monitor the Cas-
pian Sea region. Efforts to develop a common energy policy lead inevitably 
to considerations about the prospects of the Caspian Sea region. One of the 
obstacles to properly tapping this potential is the continuos absence of an 
agreed legal regime for the Caspian Sea, which has complicated export 
route decisions. Nevertheless, given the high amount of oil and gas de-
 
13 See:  Friedemann Müller, Ökonomische und politische Kooperation im Kaspischen 
Raum, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Nr. B 43-44/1998, pp. 26 ff.; Roland 
Götz, Geopolitische Rivalen oder Partner? Rußland und China in der Region des 
Kaspischen Meeres, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, October 
1998, Vol. 10, pp. 1200 ff. 
14 See:  Susanne Baier-Allen (ed), Synergy in Conflict Management. What can be 
learnt from recent experiences? Baden-Baden: Nomos 1998 (Schriften des Zentrum 
für Europäische Integrationsforschung/Center for European Integration Studies, 
Vol. 9) 
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pendency from non-EU sources, “diversification of supplies“ has been the 
constant mantra of EU parlance, matched by a whole array of suggestions 
for increasing stability and the prospects for prosperity and democratic 
governance in the region. A proposal of the European Commission for a 
consistent EU policy towards the Caspian Sea region was rejected by the 
Council of Ministers in 1995. It had included the suggestion of a stronger 
political profile of the EU in the whole Caspian Sea region through an in-
tensified political dialogue. 
This setback reflected the ongoing differences of interests among EU 
member states on questions with links to old standing ties, loyalties and 
connections of one or two of them. Given the dominance of British oil 
companies in the “Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium“ it was no 
wonder that business interests were transformed into political veto powers. 
Nevertheless, the European Council agreed in 1998 on expressing a general 
interest in exploiting the energy resources in the Caspian Sea region, 
matched with EU support for regional stability and for a diversified pipe-
line network. The declaration also made it clear that strategic decisions 
about pipeline routes should be taken by the companies involved on the 
basis of commercial considerations.
15 Since 1993, the European Union pro-
vides funds for the construction of a Eurasian transport corridor, 
TRACECA (Transport System Europe-Caucasus-Asia, informally known 
as the Great Silk Road), which shall help the countries of the region to con-
nect with the world market. As much as this is a noble undertaking - fol-
lowed by the INOGATE program, an EU initiative which appraises oil and 
gas export routes from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, and routes for 
shipping energy to Europe - it is less than a consistent and sustainable 
common foreign policy of the EU on matters relevant to the Caspian Sea 
region. 
It might well be that this is too much to be asked from the European Union 
at this point in time. Founded in 1957 as a Community for Economic Co-
operation, the EU has gone quite a way to today’s search for a coherent and 
 
15  See: 2085th Council Meeting, General Affairs, Declaration on Caspian energy 
(pipelines), Luxembourg, 27. April 1998 
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efficient Common Foreign and Security Policy. Until the EU is capable of 
projecting Europe’s interests and to influence the course of world affairs, it 
will have to continuously intensify its efforts and produce the necessary 
political will. To perceive the world through the lens of the “lakes of 
Europe“ - which after all, at least in the South and South-East of Europe, is 
of somewhat a frontal or peripheral nature - might be too much to be asked 
from the EU at this point in time. This does not mean that the EU would 
not be well advised to learn to understand and to assess the role and poten-
tial of its lakes as bridges to new horizons and interests.  
Nevertheless, one has to be realistic. The view within the European Union 
is not one of a bird’s eye. It is not global and strategic in nature, but rather 
incremental and bound by the current parameters of the EU. Every 
enlargement of EU membership has added new perspectives, dimensions 
and challenges to the EU’s lists of policies. In this regard, the end of the 
Cold War has begun to bring the EU closer to the lakes of Europe and to a 
reflection about the EU’s interests involved with them. 
This incremental approximation to a consistent policy for its lakes and pe-
ripheral neighborhoods can well be seen in regard to the Black Sea. Since 
1999, the European Union is conducting membership negotiations with 
Romania and Bulgaria. One day, the coastal cities of both countries at the 
Black Sea will become cities within the European Union. Once Constanza 
and Varna will be as much part of the European Union as Limerick or 
Porto, the EU will inevitably be forced to deal with the world “out there“ 
and on the other sides of its own borders. Time will come to invent an ap-
propriate equivalent to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the Black 
Sea region as long as the EU wants to demonstrate its capacity and will to 
project interests beyond the borders defined by membership.  
To grant Turkey the status of a membership candidate - without beginning 
membership negotiations - has opened a new dimension of the discovery of  
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the Black Sea region by the EU.
16 The formulation of an EU strategy to-
wards the Ukraine and the development of the EU Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe after the fourth Yugoslavian War of Secession in 1999 have 
added further dimensions to the evolution of a coherent Black Sea region 
policy of the EU.
17 In the Caucasus region, the EU is supporting regional 
cooperation among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, all of whom have 
joined the Council of Europe, where they are sitting side by side with Rus-
sia, Turkey, the Ukraine and the Balkan countries. From the point of view 
of the Council of Europe, the Black Sea truly is a European lake. 
The Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions are united in being regions torn 
between their European orientation and their peripheral, Eurasian aspects, 
their hope for wealth and expectations of future power, but also confronted 
with their various crises and a huge array of conflicts and problems of some 
magnitude: High birth rates and high unemployment, ethnic strife and refu-
gee movements, limits to democratic rule of law and high corruption, clan 
loyalties and Islamic revival, problems of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and seedbeds of terrorism, ambitions of external powers to in-
fluence domestic politics and to potentially undermine stability in some of 
the young countries - the region of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea is 
part of the long belt of conflicts stretching from Northern Africa to South 
East Asia. Yet, it is a peripheral European region. 
 
16  Hüseyin Bagci/Jackson Janes/Ludger Kühnhardt (Ed.), Parameters of Partnership: 
The US - Turkey - Europe, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999 (Schriften des Zentrum für 
Europäische Integrationsforschung/Center for European Integration Studies, Vol. 
14) 
17 See  Jackson Janes/Oleg Kokoshinsky/Peter Wittschorek (ed.), Ukraine, Europe, and 
the United States. Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2000 (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsfor-
schung/Center for European Integration Studies, Vol.22); Rafael Biermann, The 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - potential, problems and perspectives, ZEI 
Discussion Paper C 56/ 1999 (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies); Emil 
Mintchev, Southeastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, ZEI Discussion 
Paper C 82/2001 (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies); Janusz Bugajski, 
Facing the future: The Balkans to the year 2010, ZEI Discussion Paper C86/2001 
(Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies) 
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This must have implications for Europe’s dealing with its lakes of trouble. 
First of all, the Black Sea, and subsequently the Caspian Sea, have to be 
discovered as European lakes, as regions of interest for Europe and regions 
of interlocking interests with Europe. Secondly, Europe has to accept its 
willingness to develop proactive policies in these regions and for these re-
gions, linking them with the rest of Europe beyond ad hoc crises manage-
ment and presumptive conflict management. The EU has to define a pre-
emptive and inclusive strategy of partnership with the region. This might 
continuously lead to differentiated instruments, strategies and tactics. 
While some countries of the Black Sea like Romania and Bulgaria will be-
come members of the EU, others like Turkey - and potentially the Ukraine 
and Moldavia - will get even closer and eventually into the EU, while again 
others such as Russia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain 
linked with the European architecture through the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE. At some point, membership of Kazakhstan - which is a member 
of the OSCE - in the Council of Europe might appear on the agenda. 
All in all, it must be Europe’s interest to support cooperation in the region 
of the Southern lakes of Europe. After the first wave of geopolitical “grand 
designs“ seems to be over, a growing differentiation and increasing sense 
of cooperation is evident in the Black and Caspian Sea regions. While Tur-
key was until recently seen in the West as the cornerstone of a politics of 
oil trying to limit the powers of Russia, Turkey itself has started to cooper-
ate with Russia on this matter. In the light of a growing energy demand in 
Turkey, the country has signed a contract with the Russian energy company 
Gazprom, leading to a gas pipeline across the Black Sea, the so-called Blue 
Stream Project, which started providing Turkey with oil in 2000. More re-
cent geopolitical assessments assume that the perspective of a prosperous 
regional market around the Black and Caspian Sea could be more in the 
overall interests of all countries bordering the two lakes of Europe than 
new policies of exclusion and a repetition of old power games.
18 
 
18 See  Alexander Rahr, Energieressourcen im Kaspischen Meer, in: Internationale 
Politik, 56.Year, January 2001, pp. 37 ff. 
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By the same token, one should not be as naive as to believe that these eter-
nal aspects of international relations will all of a sudden disappear from the 
world. This is even less likely in a region with a higher amount of conflicts 
and a broader experience with power political considerations than hardly 
any other. The European Union will have to raise its posture and interest in 
the South Eastern Lakes of Europe and their bordering areas. This requires 
not only a consistent policy for the region and a likewise sustainable im-
plementation of it in the region. The European Union also needs a coherent 
policy towards Russia - which unlike Turkey will not be able to become a 
EU candidate for reasons of size and Russia’s self-esteem as a global 
power. And it needs a coherent contribution to a common and consistent 
transatlantic agenda for the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, recognizing the 
different degrees of involvement in the European architecture, but also the 
different links of both regions with the global agenda for the 21
st century. 
The American presence in the region, including the profile and posture of 
NATO, is a crucial dimension which has to be taken into account in order 
to define a coherent “Western“ strategy for the South Eastern Lakes of 
Europe. How well this can interlock without overlapping or leading to in-
consistent duplications in the overall efforts to stabilize and develop the 
region by integrating it as much as possible and as gradually as necessary 
into the Euro-Atlantic architecture can be studied with respect to the North-
ern Dimension of Europe’s lakes, namely in the Baltic Sea region. 
IV.  The Northern dimension: Baltic Sea and North Sea 
The Baltic Sea has no ancient history. Its classical age began during the 
period of the Hanse League in the 14
th and more so in the 15
th century. The 
settlements of the German Orders along the southern coasts of the Baltic 
Sea in the 13
th century followed the proliferation of city establishments in 
North-Central Europe based on German models of city law in the 12
th and 
13
th centuries. But it was not before the high tide of the Hanse League that 
the Baltic Sea was discovered as a geographical one and an interdependent 
merchant market. Gdansk and Riga, Reval (today’s Tallinn) and Abo (to-
day’s Turku), Stockholm and Visby, even Oslo and Bergen on Norway’s 
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North Sea coast and Hull and London in England became leading merchant 
bases for the Hanse traders.  
Visby on Gotland developed somehow into the secret capital of the Hanse. 
Since the end of the Cold War, which also cut the Baltic Sea into two for 
various decades, its charm is again being discovered by visitors from all the 
four shores of the Baltic Sea. The Hanse was a virtual empire, not politi-
cally ruling any place but binding together by market forces and merchant 
versatility what was otherwise kept apart by languages and different politi-
cal rulers. The County Holstein, the Free Hanse City of Lübeck, the Duchy 
of Mecklenburg, and the Duchy of Pommerania in the Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Sweden, 
the German Order in Livonia and Prussia, the Duchy of Nowgorod, and 
huge uninhabited areas along all coasts, particularly in today’s Sweden and 
Finland - thus were the geopolitical contours of the Baltic Sea in the 15
th 
century. 
The 16
th century saw the Protestant Reformation widely succeeding in the 
Baltic region. What had been united in the Hanse spirit during the 15
th cen-
tury, became united then in the spirit of Martin Luther’s reformation, leav-
ing small Catholic islands in Pommeranian, in today’s northern Poland, and 
in Lithuania, then part of the German Order. In later centuries, the Baltic 
Sea region lost a sense of oneness and its littoral parts were dragged into 
the history of national sovereignty, nationalism and power conflicts. The 
20
th century led to the sharpest ever division of the Baltic Sea: During the 
decades of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea became the maritime extension of 
the Berlin Wall and the division of Germany. As Europe was split in two 
along the fences of the iron curtain, the Baltic Sea suffered a wet iron cur-
tain. Military build-up on both sides of the virtual line, espionage by sub-
marines and the never vanishing hope to use the water as a means to flee 
from the world of totalitarianism into the camp of Western freedom - these 
were but some of the prevailing features of the Cold War-divide that shat-
tered the notion of a common Northern lake of Europe. 
After the end of the Cold War, a rediscovery of old and lasting ties began. 
The feeling of neighborhood was matched by the understanding that the 
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waters of the Baltic Sea did no longer divide but rather bring people, ideas 
and goods together. Soon after 1990, first efforts started to also politically 
reactivate the notion of the Baltic Sea as a European lake. Though the emo-
tional intensity and strategic implications did never reach the level of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at the southern lake of Europe, Baltic Sea 
Cooperation became the Northern Dimension of European Security.  
For the Scandinavian countries, the end of the Cold War meant the begin-
ning of a redefinition of their role as European countries. Sweden and Fin-
land joined the European Union in 1995. Along with Poland, the newly 
independent Baltic countries Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became candi-
dates for EU membership and are about to fully join the European Union 
around 2004. But while Poland was able to join NATO in 1999, the Baltic 
States were still looking for this strategic and military anchoring in the At-
lantic civilization.
19 For Germany and Denmark, both members of the EU 
and of NATO, the opening of a new Baltic Sea cooperation was very en-
couraging from the very outset. One of the additional values added to the 
idea of a reunified Baltic Sea was the presence and inclusion of Russia, not 
only with its historical window to the West, St. Petersburg, but also with 
the more sensible former East Prussian region which figures as Russia’s 
Oblast Kaliningad since the end of World War II.
20  
After preliminary talks between the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Russia and Ger-
many along with a representative of the European Commission, the „Coun-
cil of the Baltic Sea States“ was created in March 1992 at the initiative of 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Danish counter-
 
19 See  Frank Ronge (Hg.), Die baltischen Staaten auf dem Weg in die Europäische 
Union. ZEI Discussion Paper C1/1998, Bonn 1998 (Center for European Integra-
tion Studies); Sven Arnswald/Markus Wenig (eds.), German and American Policies 
towards the Baltic States. The Perspectives of EU and NATO Enlargement, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2000 (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsfor-
schung/Center for European Integration Studies, Vol. 20); Georg Klöcker (ed)., Ten 
Years after the Baltic States reentered the International Stage, Baden-Baden: No-
mos 2001 (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung/Center for 
European Integration Studies, Vol. 36)  
20 See  Gennady Fedorow, Kaliningrad Alternatives today, ZEI Discussion Paper C 
80/2000 (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies) 
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part Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The Council was intended not only to support 
the economic and political cooperation in the region, but also to encourage 
and initiate cooperation in such fields as environmental protection, tourism 
and transportation infrastructure. To include the European Union, always 
represented both by the rotating EU Presidency and the European Commis-
sion, meant to strengthen the EU’s involvement in the idea of Baltic Sea 
Cooperation.  
Annual meetings of the foreign ministers supported the overall goals and 
gave them the necessary sense of direction. In 1994, for example, the For-
eign Ministers meeting of the Council of the Baltic Sea States created the 
„Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights“ and in 
1996, a „Task Force on Organized Crime“ was initiated. Working Groups 
on Nuclear Safety and Radiation or on Economic Cooperation, a Business 
Advisory Council or the creation of a „Euro-Faculty“ located in Riga 
broadened the scope of activities under the umbrella of the Council on Bal-
tic Sea States, supported by a small secretariat in Stockholm and funded by 
all eleven members of the Council. Below the level of the overall Baltic 
Sea Cooperation, sub-regional activities - which include around 160 re-
gional and local political authorities - were encouraged not the least in or-
der to accompany the pre-accession process of the new, soon to be EU 
member states of the region. 
Sub-regional cooperation was also among the priorities of the Russian 
Presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States in 2001/2002. To include 
Russia as an equal partner into the Baltic Sea Cooperation scheme has 
proven to be one of the great geopolitical achievements realized through 
the overarching approach. From the beginning, Russia supported the eco-
nomic component with particular emphasis on energy, transport, border 
area infrastructure and the removal of trade barriers. The Russian Presi-
dency in the Council also promoted the interaction between the Council of 
Baltic Sea States and the European Union. And it served the constructive 
inclusion of the Kaliningrad Oblast into the framework of all Baltic Sea 
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cooperation activities.
21 Russia’s Western partners remain concerned about 
the high degree of nuclear waste in Russia’s Northwest and its implication 
for the environment and for human health alike. 
The Foreign Ministers meeting of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 
June 2001 in Hamburg, under German Presidency, had already agreed on 
the assumption „that the EU enlargement provides prospects for the areas 
along the future external borders of the EU in the region...This is specifi-
cally valid with regard to cross border contacts and economic development 
in the Russian Oblasts of Kaliningrad, Pskov, Leningrad, Novgorod and the 
city of St. Petersburg.“ Following the Hamburg summit, „Euro-Faculty“ 
extended its teaching activities into Kaliningrad 
22 For Russia, Baltic Sea 
Cooperation had become extremely valuable and meaningful in order to 
help supporting the transformation of Kaliningrad Oblast into a pilot-
project of Russia’s long-term inter-regional cooperation with the EU. In 
March 2002, the Foreign Ministers of the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
met in Kaliningrad for their annual summit, thus underlying the importance 
of the inclusion of this most neglected area of the Baltic Sea into the over-
all process as defined by the developments of knowledge and technology-
based societies in the new century. 
While assuming the role of the annually rotating Presidency in the summer 
of 2000, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had described the need 
to coordinate the activities of the Council of Baltic Sea States with the 
„Northern Dimension“ program of the European Union. EU activities and 
multilateral cooperation including also the non-EU member states of the  
 
21 See:  Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Priorities of the Russian Presidency 
2001-2002, in: 
http://www.baltinfo.org/Docs/ministerial/21/Russian%20priorities.htm 
22 See:  Council of the Baltic Sea States, Tenth Ministerial Session, Hamburg, 7 June 
2001, Communiqué, in: 
http://www.baltinfo.org/Docs/ministerial/20/Hamburg%201.htm 
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region should „complement one another“. This holds particularly true for 
the intensified use of the economic potential of cooperation in the region.
23  
The shift from a perspective of fear or even threat to a focus on „opportu-
nity“ and „potential“ is the single most strategic benefit which has evolved 
in the Baltic Sea region over the 1990s.
24 This does not mean that no prob-
lems prevail. But the fact that after the current wave of EU enlargement 90 
per cent of the Baltic Sea coastline will belong to the European Union, 
marks a more than visible shift in the geopolitical make-up of the Baltic 
Sea, giving more room for community building and enhancing stability and 
security in the whole region. 
In this sense, Baltic Sea cooperation has developed into a role-model for 
regional cooperation in one of the Lake Regions of Europe. It had never 
been conceived against Russia and in fact developed into a useful arena of 
cooperation with Russia. This is also true with regard to the hard security 
aspects of cooperation and consultation in the Baltic Sea region.
25 Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania strive to become members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, thus achieving the fullest possible integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic security structures. While Russia tried to claim a veto posi-
tion on this issue over a long period during the 1990s, the emotions have 
seemingly cooled down in the context of improved Western relations with 
Russia. 
The idea to keep the Baltic Sea free of alliances did never reflect reality. 
Germany, Denmark and Norway have always belonged to NATO, Poland 
has joined the Atlantic Alliance in 1999, Sweden and Finland are continu-
ously reconsidering their foreign and security philosophy since the end of 
 
23  Joschka Fischer, Introduction of the Programme of the German CBSS Presidency 
in 2000-2001, 9th Ministerial Session of the CBSS, Bergen 21-22 June 2000, in: 
http://www.baltinfo.org/Docs/ministerial/19/Bergen%20-
%20German%20speech.htm 
24 See:  Hans-Dieter Lucas, Perspektiven der Ostseekooperation, in: Außenpolitik, 
Year 46, 1/1995, pp. 23 ff.; Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth, The Role of the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States in Promoting Regional Co-Operation, in: http://A/Heimsoeth at 
STHLM Conference_html 
25 See:  Wolfgang Ischinger, Nicht gegen Rußland. Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im 
Ostsee-Raum, in: Internationale Politik, 53.Year, No. 2/February 1998, pp. 33 ff. 
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the Cold War. For the three Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
securing the newly gained independence can only be achieved through 
membership both in the European Union and in NATO.
26 Any trade-off on 
the matter is unacceptable for any of the three republics. The NATO sum-
mit of Prague in 2002 will see a decision on the matter of opening member-
ship negotiation with one or all the three Baltic countries.  
Since the early 1990s, NATO had already supported security cooperation 
with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on a level below membership aspira-
tions. A loose form of cooperation (BALTSEA) of some NATO partners 
with the three Baltic countries has generated a Baltic battalion for peace-
keeping missions (BALTBAT), a flight security system under Norwegian 
guidance (BALTNET) and the creation of a Baltic marine corps (BAL-
TRON), for which Germany took the role of the leading nation. Since 
1999, a German-Danish-Polish corps, based in Szezin, contributes further 
to Baltic Sea stability. All Baltic Sea states, Russia included, are part of the 
„Partnership for Peace“ initiative of NATO. The „Baltic Action Plan“ of 
January 1998 defines the fields of security cooperation between the United 
States and the three Baltic republics, who have a strong lobby in the US. 
Russia’s cooperation with the West has visibly improved under the leader-
ship of President Putin and in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the US. 
Stability and clarity on the membership in the EU and NATO will also be 
in the interest of Russia, which remains a world power and therefore not 
eligible for membership in either the EU or NATO. Russia’s overriding 
interest in reliable and consistent good neighborly relations and partnership 
focuses increasingly on economic issues. Here lies the true destiny of the 
Baltic Sea region. This aspect of the „Northern dimension of Europe“ re-
quires the optimal use of all potentials of the region, which is tight to each 
of its parts through economic and geographic interdependence. 
 
26 See:  Gerd Föhrenbach, Die Westbindung der baltischen Staaten. Zur Integration 
Estlands, Lettlands und Litauens in die bi- und multilateralen europäischen und 
transatlantischen Sicherheitsstrukturen während der 1990er Jahre, Baden-Baden 
2000(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Vol. 23) 
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The profound transition from planned economies to market economies has 
lead to enormous new opportunities to foster economic growth in the re-
gion. However, a host of problems remains. The business community re-
quires good governance in order to act in a predictable environment based 
on a transparent rule of law. Administrative capacities have to be improved 
in all the transformation societies, the Baltic countries are no exception to 
this as the European Union has indicated in all its progress reports on EU 
accession preparation with regard to Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Intellectual property rights are as much of an issue as questions of the ade-
quate structure of the education systems. Crucial for economic develop-
ment in the whole region is not only the performance of the transformation 
economies. The low economic growth rates of Germany and the Nordic 
countries during the past few years has proven to be an obstacle to eco-
nomic growth in the whole region. Tax issues and problems of regulation 
remain on the agenda in the whole region, whose goal it must be to gener-
ate complementary economic structures and growth patterns. The business 
community is regularly pleading for rather open borders of the enlarged 
European Union with Russia in order to maintain the economic dynamics 
of the Baltic Sea as a whole. This quest might collide with the evolution of 
a Common Justice and Home Affairs Policy of the EU designed to create a 
vital space of freedom, rule of law and security under the authority of the 
European Union.
27 
The potential of the Baltic Sea region stretches from Denmark with 5.3 mil-
lion people and a per capita GDP of 25.459 US-Dollar to Latvia with 2.4 
million people and a per capita income of 5.632 US-Dollar. Russia’s bor-
dering regions include 7.2 million people with a per capita GDP of only 
5.317 US-Dollar, Germany’s bordering regions include 6,3 million people 
with a per capita GDP of 23.010 US-Dollar. (The EU average per capita  
 
27 See:  Jörg Monar, EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The 
Challenge of Diversity and EU Instruments and Strategies, ZEI Discussion Paper C 
91/ 2001, Bonn 1998 (Center for European Integration Studies) 
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GDP is 21.295 US-Dollar). Most crucial of all economic variables for the 
steady development of the whole region into one flourishing market is the 
energy supply. 
Russia’s energy export into Europe covers 41 per cent of Europe’s gas and 
18 per cent of Europe’s oil demands. The plans for improving and increas-
ing the Russian energy supply to Europe as a whole and to the Baltic Sea 
region in particular are numerous.
28 This includes the upgrading and mod-
ernization of the Latvian sea port Ventspils (Windau), which currently 
clears 15 per cent of Russia’s oil exports to the West . This is not the only 
port to require fundamental restructuring, which at the end of the day is a 
question of enormous costs for investment and maintenance. 
The energy issue links the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. Strategic and en-
vironmental issues link it with the Arctic Sea. Only when all three regions 
are seen together, a clear and comprehensive picture of the „Northern Di-
mension“ of Europe can be drawn. The list of priorities for the European 
Union in this Lake region of Europe is as following: environment, nuclear 
safety, energy cooperation, Kaliningrad, infrastructure, business coopera-
tion, Justice and Home Affairs, social development.
29 From Iceland to 
North West Russia, from the Norwegian, Barents and Kara Seas in the 
North to the southern coasts of the Baltic Sea, the „Northern Dimension“ 
includes EU and non-EU countries alike. The European Union assumes that 
the Northern Dimension of its foreign policy design will increase as a con-
sequence of EU enlargement to Poland and the three Baltic republics Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania. It will bring the EU a new 1.300 kilometer long 
border with Russia. Cross-border and inter- or transregional activities re-
quire therefore the highest attention. Karelia, Neman, Saule and Baltika 
have already been named Euroregions. 
Concerning the North Sea with its cold, windy and unruly climates, oil and 
natural gas reserves are the main features which makes this lake of Europe 
attractive – apart from fishing stocks, of course. Norway is the world’s 
 
28 See:  Peer Lange, Die „Nördliche Dimension“. Europäische Energieversorgung und 
-sicherheit, in: Internationale Politik, 56.Year, No.1/ January 2001, pp. 29 ff. 
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third largest net oil exporter; this nation of 4.5 million people produces five 
per cent of the world’s oil. The resources of Norway are predicted to last 
until the mid-21st century. The United Kingdom - the world’s fourth larg-
est economy - owns significant North Sea reserves, and even Denmark, 
Germany and The Netherlands - basically known as large energy consum-
ers - have smaller North Sea oil and gas holdings. North Sea oil and gas 
were first discovered in the 1960s, the Norwegian field Ekofisk being the 
first to be exploited. A sophisticated technology, supported by stable politi-
cal and social conditions along the shores of the North Sea and the prox-
imity to huge energy hungry markets in continental Europe have generated 
an important feature to the North Sea region and thus a new dimension to 
the overall characteristics of Europe’s Lake Regions. 
North Sea oil has become one of the „benchmark“ crude oils, which is im-
portant for the fixing of oil prices worldwide. Many of the world’s major 
crude oil prices are linked to the price of the North Sea’s „Brent“ crude oil. 
Oversupplied world oil markets have regular negative effects for North Sea 
oil and gas explorations. Research is already under way on the potential 
impact of declining major North Sea oil fields in the decades to come, al-
though scholarly and politically driven controversies prevail as to whether 
a decline or, in fact, an increase in global oil production can be expected.
30 
Norway has created a Petroleum Fund, that is „a financial safety net for the 
time when oil revenues decline and a means of reducing the inflationary 
impact of oil revenues“.
31 
Whether it is oil or fish, whether it is tourism or transfer of knowledge, en-
vironmental concerns or business opportunities - the North Sea region is 
striving to develop its unifying common identity as a sub-region of Europe. 
A North Sea Commission, founded in 1989, includes more than 70 regions 
around the North Sea with approximately 40 million inhabitants. Instead of 
 
29 See:  European Commission, The Northern Dimension, in: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm 
30 See:  Roger Blanchard, The Impact of Declining Major North Sea Oil Fields upon 
Future North Sea Production, in: http:// www.oilcrisis.com/blanchard/ 
31 See:  Energy Information Administration, Country Report: Norway, in: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/norway2.html, (August 2001) 
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being labeled a „peripheral region“, the North Sea Commission is promot-
ing the common development of this Lake Region of Europe by fostering a 
corporate identity.
32 
The „Northern Dimension“ of Europe is intrinsically linked with the North 
Atlantic region. All the way to Greenland - which is the only region ever to 
resign from European Union membership although she remains a constitu-
tional part of Denmark
33 - and to the shores of Canada and the US, the 
North Atlantic region is the bridge which links both sides of the Atlantic 
civilization while at the same time giving physical evidence to the divide 
between them.  
V.  Europe : A peninsula of Asia with strong Atlantic 
bonds 
Civilizational bonds, strategic interests, economic interdependencies, 
common religious traditions and value patterns, similar political regimes, a 
history of joint experiences, both in good and in bad days: this is about the 
minimal list of commonalities between Europe - both its Lake regions and 
its hinterland - with the two Americas. From Eric the Red, who touched on 
Newfoundland around 1000, and other Viking adventurers to Christopher 
Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers, from early passages in the North Atlan-
tic to modern shipping routes, migration patterns and contemporary ties to 
those who focused on the southern half of the Atlantic, after all a long story 
beginning with the discovery of the Canary Islands in 1312, the exploration 
of Madeira since 1419 and of the Azores around 1432, until the coloniza-
tion and decolonisation of Latin America : Europe has always been linked 
to the developments on both the other shores of the Atlantic. 
 
32  See: North Sea Commission Strategy 1999 - 2006, in: 
http:/www.northsea.org/Aboutus/Strategy%20Paper.html 
33 See:  Arved Waltemathe, Austritt aus der EU. Sind die Mitgliedsstaaten noch sou-
verän?, Bern 2000 
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As part of Eurasia (Arnold Toynbee
34) or as a peninsula of Asia (Norman 
Davies)
35 Europe has both the loosest and at the same time the clearest bor-
ders to its west. It seems clear where the Atlantic Ocean begins, and it sig-
nifies a divide. The argument is often heard that Europe’s borders to the 
East are difficult to define, while those to the West are given by nature. 
This perception of nature and geography holds true only if water is primar-
ily seen as a dividing force. As we have seen in the reflection about the role 
of the Lakes of Europe for the formation of regional and pan-European 
identity formation, water can separate, but it can also unite. In doing the 
one or the other, geography and nature are a function of human activities 
and social perceptions. They can change in the course of time as much as 
the waters remain stable.  
Europe remains intrinsically tied to America. Migration patterns and cul-
tural values, religious complementarity and economic bonds, geoeconomic 
interests and strategic perceptions of the role of „the West“ in the newly 
emerging world order are binding America and Europe together. America 
and Europe are the two sides, no matter how diverse in detail and atmos-
phere, of one Atlantic civilization. This Atlantic civilization is both the an-
chor and the prolongation of the composed European geography and archi-
tecture discussed in this paper. 
Reconsidering Europe as influenced, if not even defined by the geographi-
cal facts and forces, by the resources and experiences of its „Lake Dis-
tricts“ has proved to be a stimulating endeavor. The Lakes of Europe force 
upon anyone who is defining Europe as a land mass to broaden the horizon 
 
34  In his magistral work „The Study of History“, Arnold Toynbee is deploring the use-
less dichotomy which has been developed in order to distinguish Europe from Asia, 
while in reality the geographical notion of „Eurasia“ and the recognition of mutual 
inspiration of both the worlds East and West of the Bosphorus seem to be more 
fruitful. Europas borders to the East have always had much more of a „limen“ 
(threshold) than of a „limes“(border wall): Arnold Toynbee, The Study of History. 
Abridgement of Volumes VII-X, Oxford 1957 
35  In his impressive and magistral study „Europe. A History“, Norman Davies refers 
to Europe as a „cape of the old continent, a Western appendix of Asia. In spite of 
the enormous variety of physical features, climate, geology and fauna Europe „is 
not really a continent at all; it is not a self-contained land mass.“: Norman Davies, 
Europe. A History, Oxford 1996, p. 47 
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and to take note of those „lake-based-factors“ which also have influenced 
and continue to influence Europe, contribute to its development through the 
medium of lakes and waters which unite rather than divide. The thesis, in 
fact, holds true that coastal regions have been - and most likely remain - the 
most dynamic forces in history. This is true for the Lakes of Europe and it 
is true for Europe as a whole. 
Europe would remain bound to a parochial view of itself if it were to 
organize and shape only the land mass of Europe. Europe has to look 
beyond its land and even beyond the other sides of its sea shores in order to 
grasp the complete picture of its position in the world of the 21
st century. 
While Europe is discovering or rediscovering some of its lakes as, in fact, 
„European“, it will have to even look beyond the Lakes of Europe in order 
to properly contextualize Europe’s links with the other shores of the 
Atlantic and other regions of the world.  
Europe can be a partner for the world only if it projects itself beyond the 
very borders of Europe. Since the European Union is developing increas-
ingly into the embodiment of Europe’s organized political will and the pro-
jection of Europe’s economic power - while the cultural diversity of Europe 
and its concern for identity and values remain more comprehensively em-
bedded in the work of the Council of Europe - it has to develop proper in-
struments and mechanisms to look beyond Europe. Looking beyond land 
masses and countries is already a useful step in the necessary process of 
Europe’s „broadening of the horizon“. The Lakes of Europe offer specific 
and stimulating features to rethink Europe anew in the world of 
geoeconomics, geopolitics and intercultural dialogue which will shape the 
21
st century. 
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